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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine if a major health system developed a unique app for 
detecting new cases of COVID-19 up to a week before the current, widely 
used Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) tests.  Users of the app would be 
required to wear a smartwatch capable of tracking their heart rate for 
at least eight hours each day.  They would also fill out a baseline 
questionnaire with their age, BMI, gender, race, ethnicity, occupation 
and medical history, as well as a daily questionnaire reporting any 
*Leon and Gloria Plevin Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.  I am 
grateful to the Charles M. Koch Foundation, and Cleveland State University’s COVID-19 
Rapid Response Faculty Research Fund for generously supporting the research for this 
Essay and related projects and the editors of the Seton Hall Law Review, especially Avi 
Muller and Lilli Wofsy for their excellent editing and infinite patience. 
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COVID-19-related symptoms they are experiencing and results of any 
COVID-19 tests.1 
Now consider an algorithm that could use a broader range of 
information that many wearable devices like smartphones, 
smartwatches, and Fitbit devices regularly collect, including heart rate, 
step counts, sleep patterns, and others, to identify that someone likely 
has contracted COVID-19 up to nine days before they show any 
symptoms.2  Surely most individuals would applaud these new tools.  
They leverage the technologies many people routinely use, and the 
information they already regularly share with private companies, to 
potentially save lives and mitigate the devastating economic effects of 
the pandemic.  Indeed, press accounts of these promising new 
technologies lauded them as potentially powerful new tools to control 
the spread of COVID-19.3  
While each of these tools clearly raises privacy concerns, those 
concerns could be managed with relatively routine protections, like 
requiring informed consent and applying the kinds of controls already 
used to protect sensitive health information.  We might even design 
some additional protections to ensure that identifiable information is 
immediately destroyed after it is processed and that only de-identified 
and aggregated data is kept for later analysis.  
In light of the tremendous potential—the possibility of saving 
thousands of lives—it would seem unreasonable to declare that the 
privacy risks these tools pose should stop us from piloting them.  We 
should at least try to save lives, even if the preliminary studies 
acknowledged the need to test these tools with much larger numbers of 
people to ensure they work (and that it seems clear the tools will require 
widespread testing to work well).4  Likewise, it would be foolish to 
 1 Robert P. Hirten et al., Physiological Data from a Wearable Device Identifies SARS-
CoV-2 Infection and Symptoms and Predicts COVID-19 Diagnosis: Observational Study, 23 
J. MED. INTERNET RES. 2, 4 (2021) .  
 2 See Tejaswini Mishra, et al., Pre-Symptomatic Detection of COVID-19 from 
Smartwatch Data, 4 NATURE BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING 1208 (Nov. 18, 2020), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41551-020-00640-6.pdf. 
 3 See, e.g., Megan Cerullo, Smartwatches Can Help Detect COVID-19 Days Before 
Symptoms Appear, CBS NEWS (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/covid-
symptoms-smart-watch/; Chance Miller, New Studies Show How Apple Watch Can Help 
Detect COVID-19 Prior to Symptoms and Testing, 9TO5MAC (Jan. 16, 2021), 
https://9to5mac.com/2021/01/16/apple-watch-covid-studies-detection; Darrell 
Etherington, Mount Sinai Study Finds Apple Watch Can Predict COVID-19 Diagnosis up to 
a Week Before Testing, TECH CRUNCH (Feb. 9, 2021), https://techcrunch.com/2021/02/
09/mount-sinai-study-finds-apple-watch-can-predict-covid-19-diagnosis-up-to-a-
week-before-testing.  
4 See Hirten et al., supra note 1; Mishra et al., supra note 2.  
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declare that these apps should never collect specific types of sensitive 
information that health authorities could use to combat the pandemic.  
Yet, that is precisely what happened with early proposals during 
the COVID-19 pandemic.  The possibility that digital contact tracing apps 
could collect personal information that most people already routinely 
share was dismissed by many as too invasive and risky in spite of the 
fact that these apps offered even stronger privacy protections than the 
tools just described and at least equal and possibly greater potential 
benefits to society.5  At the same time, Google and Apple exerted their 
nearly complete control over the global smartphone market to force 
governments across the world to enforce the hasty consensus that 
digital contact tracing apps should be prohibited from collecting 
location or information other than anonymized Bluetooth identifiers 
designed to estimate if a user was exposed to the virus. 
Much commentary on digital contact tracing and other tools has 
shown a puzzling resistance to thinking through how these apps could 
allow public health officials to responsibly collect information to aid 
their efforts in combating the virus while still respecting pre-existing 
privacy norms in the public health context.  Instead, a confounding 
consensus has emerged that even basic information like location data 
should be off the table because of the privacy risks its collection raises 
even though public health authorities routinely collect and responsibly 
use that same information to combat the spread of infectious disease 
through manual contact tracing and other processes.6  This consensus 
ignores both the privacy tradeoffs society routinely makes in the public 
health context to protect ourselves from far lesser threats, as well as the 
 5 See, e.g., Jane Bambauer & Brian Ray, COVID-19 Apps Are Terrible—They Didn’t 
Have to Be, LAWFARE DIGITAL SOCIAL CONTRACT (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.lawfare
blog.com/covid-19-apps-are-terrible-they-didnt-have-be. 
 6 See, e.g., Dali Kafaar et al., Joint Statement on Contact Tracing: Date 19th April 2020 
(Apr. 19, 2020), https://giuper.github.io/JointStatement.pdf (“Bluetooth-based 
solutions for automated contact tracing are strongly preferred [over GPS location] when 
available.”); World Health Org., Ethical Considerations to Guide the Use of Digital 
Proximity Tracking Technologies for COVID-19 Contact Tracing: Interim Guidance 3 (May 
28, 2020), https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-2019-nCoV-Ethics_
Contact_tracing_apps-2020.1 (“[D]ata collection should not require the identity or 
location data of a user, or a time stamp of a proximity event.”); Euro. Data Protection 
Board, Guidelines 04/2020 on the Use of Location Data and Contact Tracing Tools in the 
Context of the COVID-19 Outbreak (Apr. 21, 2020) https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/
files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_20200420_contact_tracing_covid_with_annex_en.pdf; 
(“[C]ontact tracing apps do not require tracking the location of individual users.  Instead, 
proximity data should be used.”); Paige M.. Boshell, The Power of Place: Geolocation 
Tracking and Privacy, A.B.A. (Mar. 25, 2019), https://businesslawtoday.org/2019/03/
power-place-geolocation-tracking-privacy (describing how private companies collect 
consumer location data). 
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creative approaches that were emerging to responsibly use location and 
other information while still protecting privacy.7  
The result is that the digital contact tracing apps in operation today 
protect privacy at the expense of efficacy and equity.  They are 
underpowered by design, undersubscribed and ironically untrusted in 
spite (or perhaps because) of the extraordinary measures these tech 
giants have taken to protect privacy.8  As of early 2021, fewer than half 
of the states in the United States (“U.S.”)  have even proposed using a 
contact tracing or exposure notification app.9  Even in those, download 
rates are low and usage rates even lower.10  These miserable statistics 
seem to prove correct early critics who argued that proposals to use 
digital contact tracing to help combat the pandemic were, as one 
prominent technologist put it, “just plain dumb.”11  
But these statistics are based solely on experience with the specific 
system that Google and Apple develop.  By design and policy, that 
system prevents health authorities from using these apps to collect the 
same kinds of information they already use to understand and prevent 
the spread of communicable disease.  These same limits effectively shut 
down alternative models that were emerging and that proposed to 
responsibly collect other information that could have made these apps 
more effective and accessible.  That same information is critical to help 
understand whether these apps work as well as how this disease and 
the apps themselves affect the most vulnerable communities. 
This Essay describes how the privacy debate that emerged over 
digital contact tracing and Google’s and Apple’s decisions to strictly limit 
apps permitted to use their platforms resulted in undercutting their 
potential usefulness as a tool to combat the pandemic while still failing 
to engender trust in these tools as intended.  Part II describes the 
7 See infra Part II.B. 
 8 See Lindsay Muscato, Why People Don’t Trust Contact Tracing Apps and What to 
Do About It, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/
11/12/1012033/why-people-dont-trust-contact-tracing-apps-and-what-to-do-about-
it; Alejandro De La Garza, Contact Tracing Apps Were Big Tech’s Best Idea for Fighting 
COVID-19. Why Haven’t They Helped?, TIME (Nov. 10, 2020), https://time.com/59057
72/covid-19-contact-tracing-apps. 
9 See Zac Hall, Which U.S. States Are Using Apple’s Exposure Notification API for 
COVID-19 Contact Tracing?, 9TO5MAC (Jan. 16, 2021), https://9to5mac.com/2021/01/
16/covid-19-exposure-notification-api-states. 
10 See Muscato, supra note 8; De La Garza, supra note 8.  
 11 Bruce Schneier, Me on COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY BLOG 
(May 1, 2020), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/05/me_on_covid-19; 
see also Ashkan Soltani et al., Contact-Tracing Apps Are Not a Solution to the COVID-19 
Crisis, BROOKINGS TECH STREAM (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/
inaccurate-and-insecure-why-contact-tracing-apps-could-be-a-disaster. 
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Google-Apple exposure notification system that quickly became the 
dominant model for digital contact tracing in the U.S. and Europe and 
the alternatives that were emerging early in the pandemic that Google’s 
and Apple’s entries into digital contact tracing effectively preempted. 
Part III briefly recounts the factors that resulted in the privacy 
consensus that emerged early in the pandemic and that the Google-
Apple system embodies.  That consensus developed out of legitimate 
concerns that the federal government, in particular, would use the 
pandemic to expand domestic surveillance in ways similar to the post-
9/11 era, as well as the growing resistance to the exploitation of 
consumer data by large technology companies.  Two related phenomena 
reinforced it.  First, pre-existing concerns over expansion of police 
surveillance were intensified by extensive use of social media and other 
sources to surveil the Black Lives Matter protests in Spring 2020.  
Second, the growing resistance to government response efforts, 
including mask orders and lockdowns, created tremendous political 
opposition to any expansion of state power. 
Part IV argues that a contextual understanding of privacy in the 
public health context generally, and this pandemic, specifically, would 
allow for potentially more effective apps that permit health authorities 
responsibly to collect and use more information.  It compares the 
Google-Apple Bluetooth-only system with the original Safe Paths 
proposal to combine that Bluetooth proximity tool with location 
information to illustrate this.  Part IV then explores how other types of 
information have the potential to make these apps even more powerful 
tools and why some of that information is critical to evaluating whether 
these tools are working and how they are affecting different 
communities.  
Part V identifies a minimum set of principles that a pandemic 
privacy law should include to enable responsible use of data to protect 
public health during future pandemics.  Such a law would enable 
responsible use of both individual and aggregate information while still 
protecting against the core privacy and equity concerns raised by digital 
contact tracing. 
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II. DIGITAL CONTACT TRACING
A.  The Google-Apple System 
Most commentary to date has focused on apps using the very 
specific system that Google and Apple adapted from similar early 
models and established as the de facto international standard for apps 
permitted to use the interoperable Bluetooth function they created.12  
These tech giants labeled their system as performing “exposure 
notification” or proximity tracking to distinguish it from traditional 
contact tracing.13  The system allows users only to identify that they 
have come into close proximity with someone who has tested positive 
rather than providing the detailed location and other information 
collected in traditional contact tracing.  Applications using the system—
and more recently the hardware function embedded in smartphones 
using Apple’s or Google’s respective operating systems—allow users to 
turn on a Bluetooth function that operates in the phone’s background by 
sending and storing on each user’s device rotating identifiers or keys to 
anonymously identify a device.14  These keys are collected when two or 
more users running the app come into close contact for a defined period 
of time, typically fifteen minutes.  The app incorporates an algorithm to 
estimate the distance between users based on the strength of the 
Bluetooth signal received from another device.  The keys do not include 
location, time, or any other identifying information, only the fact that 
there likely was a close contact with another anonymized user.15  
In addition to limiting the information these apps collect, Google 
and Apple also have imposed a stricter set of policies on them than they 
place on run-of-the-mine consumer applications.16  To start, they 
 12 See, e.g., Casey Newton, Why Countries Keep Bowing to Apple and Google’s Contact 
Tracing App Requirements, THE VERGE (May 8, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/
interface/2020/5/8/21250744/apple-google-contact-tracing-england-germany-
exposure-notification-india-privacy; Apple and Google, Exposure Notification: Bluetooth 
Specification, Preliminary—Subject to Modification and Extension, Apr. 2020 v1.2 (Apr. 
2020) [hereinafter Bluetooth Specification], https://covid19-static.cdn-apple.com/
applications/covid19/current/static/contact-tracing/pdf/ExposureNotification-
BluetoothSpecificationv1.2.pdf. 
 13 See Matthew Panzarino, Apple and Google Are Launching a Joint COVID-19 Tracing 
Tool for iOS and Android, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 10, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/
04/10/apple-and-google-are-launching-a-joint-covid-19-tracing-tool. 
14 See id.; see also Bluetooth Specification, supra note 12. 
15 Panzarino, supra note 13. 
16 See Khari Johnson, Apple and Google Prohibit Location Tracking in New Contact 
Tracing Guidelines, VENTURE BEAT (May 4, 2020), https://venturebeat.com/2020/05/
04/apple-and-google-prohibit-location-tracking-in-new-contact-tracing-guidelines; 
APPLE, Exposure Notification APIs Addendum, 1–3 (May 4, 2020) [hereinafter, Apple 
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prohibit apps using this tool from allowing users to enable the app to 
collect any information other than the Bluetooth keys.  Apps also are 
required to store those keys on a user’s device unless and until the user 
tests positive and separately consents to provide the stored keys to a 
server maintained by a public health authority.  A public health 
authority must either develop the app or sponsor it and the companies 
permit only one app per state in the U.S.17 
If your goal is to minimize privacy risks at any cost, then this 
approach makes sense.  The system stores only anonymized 
information that is extremely difficult to connect to any other 
information to identify a user.  It also gives users complete control over 
whether to share even that information with anyone, including public 
health authorities.  Finally, it limits access to that information to health 
authorities and requires that health authorities provide an official code 
for users to self-identify as receiving a positive COVID-19 diagnosis.18   
The problem is that several of these protections compromise the 
system’s effectiveness.  Using Bluetooth has several distinct advantages 
for contact tracing over alternatives like location tracking using GPS and 
cell tower data.  Bluetooth operates by devices signaling each other 
rather than a satellite or cell tower so it can function underground and 
inside buildings.  Bluetooth also is better suited than sources like GPS or 
Wi-Fi signals for estimating whether a person was within the six-feet 
distance epidemiologists agree is necessary for potential exposure.19 
But collecting only Bluetooth-based proximity information without 
related context, especially location and time, reduces the app to doing 
only one thing: alerting a user that she may have been exposed to an 
infected person.20  This substantially limits what both users and health 




17 See Johnson, supra note 16; Apple Exposure Notification, supra note 16. 
18 Johnson, supra note 16. 
19 See Ramesh Raskar et al., Contact Tracing: Holistic Solution Beyond Bluetooth 
[hereinafter Holistic Solution], https://github.com/PrivateKit/PrivacyDocuments/
blob/master/ContactTracingBeyondBluetooth.pdf; see also COVID SafePaths, COVID-19 
Contact-Tracing Mobile Apps: Evaluation and Assessment for Decision Makers, at 12 
[hereinafter COVID SafePaths], https://github.com/PrivateKit/PrivacyDocuments/
blob/master/apps-evaluation.pdf.  
20 See Holistic Solution, supra note 19; COVID SafePaths, supra note 19. 
 21 See Holistic Solution, supra note 19; Camera Culture Group, MIT Media Lab, Adding 
Location Context to Apple/Google Exposure Notification Bluetooth API: MIT SafePaths 
Encryption Proposals for GPS + Bluetooth, Ver. 0.1, (Apr. 26, 2020) [hereinafter Adding 
Location Context]. 
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Manual contact tracing involves identifying where someone who 
has tested positive recently visited and whom they may have exposed.22  
Without collecting contextual information, including the location and 
time of potential exposures as measured by the Bluetooth signal, the 
Google-Apple system cannot be used by manual contact tracers either 
to identify potential new cases or augment a person’s memory.  That 
system also cannot provide other useful information like identifying 
infected spaces for decontamination or assist in predicting likely future 
infection hotspots.23  Instead, Apple and Google have created an entirely 
separate, relatively unreliable, system that, at best, offers the possibility 
that new cases could be identified even before the traditional process. 
Even that limited promise requires a significant number of people 
to download and start running the app on a regular basis.  Early research 
on Bluetooth-only models suggested that close to 60% of smartphone 
users would need to use an app to substantially reduce the spread of the 
virus, although lower rates could have some impact.24  
Bluetooth-only systems also are highly imprecise and create 
significant risk of both 
incorrectly identifying a potential exposure (false positive) or 
failing to trigger a notification even after an epidemiologically 
significant contact (false negative).25  Even in controlled settings, the 
signal strength naturally fluctuates itself and differs by device.26  Signal 
strength is highly sensitive to where a person places their device as well 
as the surrounding environment.  Simply rotating one’s body or placing 
a device in a bag can significantly reduce the signal’s strength resulting 
in a false negative.27  Reflective surfaces, like a subway or train car, can 
amplify the signal, and Bluetooth also passes through many walls.  
Either situation can create a false positive alert.28  
22 See COVID SafePaths, supra note 19, at 6. 
23 Holistic Solution, supra note 19. 
24 See Patrick Howell O’Neill, No, Coronavirus Apps Don’t Need 60% Adoption to be 
Effective, MIT TECH REVIEW (June 5, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/
06/05/1002775/covid-apps-effective-at-less-than-60-percent-download. 
 25 See Holistic Solution, supra note 19; Jeremy Hsu, Contact Tracing Apps Struggle to 
Be Both Effective and Private, IEEE SPECTRUM (Sept. 24, 2020), https://spectrum.
ieee.org/biomedical/devices/contact-tracing-apps-struggle-to-be-both-effective-and-
private. 
 26 Amy Robinson & Jim Waldo, Technical Difficulties of Contact Tracing, LAWFARE 
(Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/technical-difficulties-contact-tracing.  
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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False positives can overburden health systems where testing 
capacity is limited and can cause economic hardship if they trigger an 
unnecessary quarantine.  False negatives may seem innocuous but risk 
creating a false sense of security that could embolden people to take 
greater risks.29  More broadly, people are far less likely to use or trust a 
tool that does not work.30  Indeed, paradoxically, by prioritizing privacy 
over efficacy, Google and Apple may well have undermined the very 
trust they intended to develop.  
Furthermore, these same limitations that make the apps less useful 
and unreliable also make it impossible to directly assess whether they 
work.31  Without allowing even the user herself to learn where and when 
a likely exposure occurred, it is impossible to determine whether the 
notification was accurate.32  These limits also prevent health authorities 
from using the information to understand the disease better.  And by 
prohibiting health authorities from collecting any other user 
information, the system also precludes any analysis of how different 
demographic groups are affected by the disease and the apps 
themselves.  
B.  The Path Not Taken 
Before Google and Apple announced these restrictions, there was 
tremendous excitement about a range of creative possibilities for 
incorporating the interoperable Bluetooth standard they were 
developing into more sophisticated applications.  These applications 
proposed to collect other potentially useful data, including symptoms to 
allow individuals to calibrate their own risk better when deciding 
whether to self-isolate and researchers to understand this new disease 
29 Id. 
 30 See Gabriel Kaptchuk et al., How Good is Good Enough for COVID19 Apps? The 
Influence of Benefits, Benefits, Accuracy, and Privacy on Willingness to Adopt, ARXIV (May 
20, 2020), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2005.04343.pdf. 
31 See Nicole Wetsman, Contact Tracing Apps Promised Big and Didn’t Deliver, THE 
VERGE (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/22168473/coronavirus-contact-
tracing-apps-exposure-notification-covid-google-apple (noting that “because of the 
apps’ focus on privacy, it may be nearly impossible to quantify how well they’re actually 
able to help prevent disease”). 
 32 See, e.g., id. (noting that researchers cannot identify “how many of the people who 
receive notifications on the apps follow isolation guidelines or get tested for COVID-
19”); Mark Briers et al., Demonstrating the Impact of the NHS COVID-19 App, ALAN TURING 
INSTITUTE (Feb. 21, 2021), https://www.turing.ac.uk/blog/demonstrating-impact-nhs-
covid-19-app (“The decentralised design of the app means that it is not possible to 
directly measure the number of notifications that each individual index case 
generates.”). 
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better.33  Rather than spurring that kind of innovation and allowing 
public health authorities to drive the configuration of these apps, Apple 
and Google effectively prevented their tool from doing anything other 
than exposure notification. 
Many of these alternative apps envisioned incorporating the 
proximity advantages of the interoperable Google-Apple Bluetooth 
system with other information, especially the time and location 
information critical for contact tracing, to create a more effective tool.34  
These apps also featured innovative approaches to protecting user 
privacy very differently from the one-size-fits-all model Apple and 
Google ultimately imposed.35  Indeed, Google’s public announcement 
seemed to anticipate such collaborations by noting that the second-
phase plan to embed the Bluetooth tool into each company’s operating 
system would “enable interaction with a broader ecosystem of apps and 
government health authorities.”36 
Safe Paths, a system developed by MIT researchers in consultation 
with the Mayo Clinic and spun off into the non-profit PathCheck 
Foundation, was one of the earliest and most prominent of these apps.37  
The original Safe Paths system included two components: (1) a 
smartphone-based app and (2) a centralized repository run by health 
authorities.  The app was designed to collect both Bluetooth proximity 
information and GPS location data.  As the Safe Paths team described in 
a series of publications, location information and Bluetooth-based 
proximity tools complement each other.38  GPS systems provide location 
information which is useful for reconstructing where a person has 
 33 See, e.g., Hannah Alsdurf et al., COVI White Paper-Ver. 1.1, ARXIV (July 27, 2020), 
at 17–20, https://arxiv.org/pdf/2005.08502.pdf; Erman Ayday et al., ShareTrace: A 
Smart Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing Solution by Architectural Design During an 
Epidemic, Ver. 1.0 (May 3, 2020), at 11, https://github.com/SafeTrace-community/
info/blob/master/ShareTrace%20-%20WhitePaper_may3.pdf.  
 34 See, e.g., Maximizing Privacy and Effectiveness in COVID-19 Apps, OPENMINED (Mar. 
24, 2020) [hereinafter Maximizing Privacy], https://blog.openmined.org/covid-app-
privacy-advice (describing multiple app proposals and advocating for a multi-function, 
privacy-protective app). 
 35 See generally id.; see also Ramesh Raskar et al., Apps Gone Rogue: Maintaining 
Personal Privacy in an Epidemic, ARXIV (Mar. 19, 2020) [hereinafter Apps Gone Rogue], 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2003.08567.pdf.  
 36 Google, Apple and Google Partner on COVID-19 Contact Tracing Technology, THE 
KEYWORD (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.blog.google/inside-google/company-
announcements/apple-and-google-partner-covid-19-contact-tracing-technology. 
 37 Apps Gone Rogue, supra note 35, at 66.  Technical details and a series of 
whitepapers regarding Safe Paths and Safe Places are available on the PathCheck public 
GitHub site, https://github.com/Path-Check (PathCheck GitHub), and the TripleBlind 
Safe Places GitHub site, https://github.com/tripleblindai/safe-places. 
 38 See Pathcheck Github, supra note 37; COVID SafePaths, supra note 19; Holistic 
Solution, supra note 19.  
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traveled, but GPS signals are not sufficiently precise to determine if a 
person was within the six-foot distance required for exposure.  
Bluetooth systems are configured to estimate that six-foot distance but, 
as discussed above, often result in false positives and false negatives.  
Location and time information provide critical context that mitigates 
these errors by allowing an individual to consider where they were, who 
was around them and what they were doing when they were exposed.39 
The second component of the Safe Paths system, called “Safe 
Places,” provided a mechanism designed to permit users to consent to 
securely upload both the Bluetooth identifiers and GPS location 
information to a public health database as part of the manual contact 
tracing process when they test positive for COVID-19.40  Contact tracers 
could use the GPS location information directly to confirm, correct and 
amplify a person’s memory during the interview process.41  After 
removing potentially sensitive locations as part of the interview, the 
remaining location information would be de-identified and aggregated 
to create public heat maps that allow both users and non-users to self-
identify potential exposures.  Public health authorities could also use de-
identified and aggregated location information to model and predict the 
location of future hotspots.42   
Safe Paths incorporated many of the same protections as Apple and 
Google.  All information is collected on a user’s device and automatically 
deleted after 14 days.  If a user tests positive she could elect to provide 
some or all of the stored information with health authorities.  Unlike 
Google and Apple, Safe Paths also creates a backend interface for health 
authorities to securely upload and process the information users 
provide and delete specific locations they did not want to include in the 
system.  Raw data is then deleted, while only de-identified, aggregated 
information is stored and eventually could be published as a public 
heatmap.43  
 39 Camera Culture Group, MIT Media Lab, Adding Location Context to Apple/Google 
Exposure Notification Bluetooth API: MIT SafePaths Encryption Proposals for GPS + 
Bluetooth, Ver. 0.1, Apr. 26, 2020 [hereinafter Adding Location Context]. 
 40 See Anil Ananthaswamy, What Do Public Health Authorities Need for COVID-19? 
Thinking beyond Exposure Notification, Contact Tracing and Heatmaps, PATHCHECK
FOUNDATION BLOG, (May 5, 2020), https://www.pathcheck.org/en/blog/what-do-public-
health-authorities-need-for-covid-19-thinking-beyond-exposure-notification-contact-
tracing-and-heatmaps.  Technical details regarding Safe Places are available on the 
PathCheck GitHub site.  See PathCheck GitHub, supra note 37.  
41 See Adding Location Context, supra note 39, at 33. 
42 See Ananthaswamy, supra note 40. 
43 Id. 
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Safe Paths was one of many alternative approaches that proposed 
allowing users to collect potentially useful information while still 
protecting their privacy.  Other apps proposed creating more refined 
risk scores for determining whether to seek testing or self-quarantine 
by combining self-reported symptoms with location and Bluetooth 
identifiers.44 Still others envisioned incorporating additional 
functions.45  It is an open question how well any of these approaches 
might have worked but by prohibiting these apps from using their new 
tool, and tightly restricting contact tracing apps generally, Google and 
Apple never gave them a chance.  
III. WHAT WENT WRONG?
Early in the pandemic, the aggressive use of intrusive digital 
surveillance by China, South Korea, Israel, and other nations created 
legitimate fear that governments across the globe might use public 
health as a cover to expand surveillance.46  These fears that health 
surveillance tools would be used for law enforcement purposes, rather 
than restricted solely to fighting the pandemic, were intensified by 
police use of mobile phone and social media information to identify and 
arrest people participating in Black Lives Matters protests.  Those fears 
were intensified when some law enforcement officials conflated those 
efforts with contact tracing generally.47  
 44 See, e.g., Alsdurf et al., supra note 33, at 4 (describing a Canadian app called COVI’s 
use of proximity and symptom tracking); Ayday et al., supra note 33, at 8 (proposing the 
use of proximity, location and symptom tracking). 
 45 See Maximizing Privacy, supra note 34 (describing examples including “a white 
label COVID Alert App, private set intersection, a differential privacy wrapper, and 
private identity”). 
 46 Peter Swire, Security, Privacy and the Coronavirus: Lessons From 9/11, LAWFARE 
(March 24, 2020, 2:46 PM), www.lawfareblog.com/security-privacy-and-coronavirus-
lessons-911; Natasha Singer & Choe Sang-Hun, As Coronavirus Surveillance Escalates, 
Personal Privacy Plummets, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/03/23/technology/coronavirus-surveillance-tracking-privacy.html. 
 47 Amos Toh & Deborah Brown, How Digital Contact Tracing for COVID-19 Could 
Worsen Inequality, JUST SECURITY (June 4, 2020, 2:25 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/
2020/06/04/how-digital-contact-tracing-covid-19-could-worsen-inequality; Andy 
Meek, Minnesota Is Now Using Contact Tracing to Track Protestors, As Demonstrations 
Escalate, BGR (May 30, 2020, 10:46 PM), https://bgr.com/2020/05/30/minnesota-
protest-contact-tracing-used-to-track-demonstrators; Isobel Asher Hamilton, 
Compulsory Selfies and Contact Tracing: Authorities Everywhere Are Using Smartphones 
to Track the Coronavirus, and It’s Part of a Massive Increase in Global Surveillance, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 14, 2020, 11:30 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
countries-tracking-citizens-phones-coronavirus-2020-3. 
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In fact, in the U.S., state and federal authorities did the opposite.48  
They actively distanced themselves from the use of digital contact 
tracing apps.49  The privacy concerns about digital contact tracing 
dovetailed with the general politicization of other government 
pandemic control measures to make even apps using the extremely 
limited Google-Apple system controversial.  Protests against shutdown 
orders and mask mandates extended to both manual and digital contact 
tracing.  One widely shared Facebook post claimed that federal 
legislation to expand and fund manual contact tracing would “give the 
government the power to forcibly remove” children from their homes.50  
An Ohio lawmaker warned constituents that “[a]rmies of agents” will be 
“trained on Apple and Google technology to trace or track people” and 
will “forcibly isolate” anyone who tests positive and all of their 
contacts.51  Only three states, including South Carolina, initially 
announced that they would develop an app using the Google-Apple 
system.52  Shortly after South Carolina announced its plans to develop 
an app, lawmakers in the state responded by amending a COVID-19 
spending bill to ban state agencies from using it.53 
As lawmakers in the U.S. went out of their way to prevent adoption 
of digital health surveillance tools, press accounts routinely reinforced 
fears that the apps under development risked unchecked expansion of 
government surveillance.54  Even stories about the Google-Apple system 
48 See Bambauer & Ray, supra note 5. 
49 See id.   
50 See Angelo Fichera, False Claim of Forced Removals Under Contact Tracing Bill, 
FACTCHECK.ORG (May 13, 2020), https://www.factcheck.org/2020/05/false-claim-of-
forced-removals-under-contact-tracing-bill. 
 51 Rep. Nino Vitale, FACEBOOK (May 12, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/Rep
Vitale/posts/2898165580261473. 
 52 See Kif Leswing, Three States Will Use Apple-Google Contact Tracing Technology 
for Virus Tracking Apps, CNBC, (last updated May 20, 2020 5:37 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/20/three-states-commit-to-apple-google-
technology-for-virus-tracking-apps.html. 
 53 Dave Perera, South Carolina Legislature Puts Coronavirus Apps on Hold, MLEX (June 
26, 2020, 5:00 PM), https://mlexmarketinsight.com/news-hub/editors-picks/area-of-
expertise/data-privacy-and-security/south-carolina-legislature-puts-coronavirus-
apps-on-hold. 
 54 See Natasha Singer & Choe Sang-Hun, As Coronavirus Surveillance Escalates, 
Personal Privacy Plummets, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/03/23/technology/coronavirus-surveillance-tracking-privacy.html; Mike Giglio, 
Would You Sacrifice Your Privacy to Get Out of Quarantine?, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2020), 
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/04/coronavirus-pandemic-privacy-civil-
liberties-911/609172. 
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routinely ignored how it actually works in favor of repeating unfounded 
concerns that it poses grave privacy risks.55 
Google’s and Apple’s early announcements of their plans to develop 
an interoperable Bluetooth standard had a direct chilling effect on the 
ecosystem of digital tools that were emerging.  Simply by announcing 
their common standard in early April 2020, even before it was ready, 
they largely preempted plans that other groups, including Safe Paths, 
were making with governments in several jurisdictions to move 
forward with alternatives.56 
Many groups continued to develop alternative models even after 
this announcement focused on the possibility of incorporating the 
interoperable Bluetooth standard these companies were creating.57  
Apple and Google’s later announcement of the restrictions they were 
imposing, in particular prohibiting apps using their Bluetooth tool from 
collecting location or other information and permitting only one app in 
each jurisdiction, essentially shut down those efforts.58 
 55 See, e.g., Evan Halper, Lawmakers Warn Coronavirus Contact-Tracing Is Ripe for 
Abusive Surveillance, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2020), www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-
04-26/privacy-americans-trade-off-trace-coronavirus-contacts. 
 56 Google and Apple announced their partnership on April 10, 2020, and promised 
to release the API that apps needed to use it in May.  See Google Partner on COVID-19 
Contact Tracing Technology, APPLE: NEWSROOM (Apr. 10, 2020) [hereinafter See Google 
Partner], https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2020/04/apple-and-google-partner-on-
covid-19-contact-tracing-technology.  I spoke with Steve Penrod, CEO of TripleBlind, 
one of the partners in the original Safe Paths group on Jan. 28, 2021.  See TripleBlind 
Github, https://github.com/tripleblindai/privatekit.  Penrod said that announcement 
immediately slowed down or completely stopped the initial rollouts of the app and plans 
they were developing in several communities.  See Conversation with Steve Penrod, 
Author’s Notes (on file with author).  As late as March 18, 2020, Safe Paths was in 
discussions with the White House to obtain official support for their system.  See Austin 
Barnes, White House Expected to Endorse Kansas City-Built COVID-19 Exposure Tracking 
App, STARTLAND NEWS (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.startlandnews.com/2020/03/
private-kit-safe-paths-triple-blind-covid-19. 
 57 See, e.g., Safe Paths Alliance, Adding Location Context to Apple/Google Exposure 
Notification Bluetooth API: MIT SafePaths Encryption Proposals for GPS + Bluetooth, 
PATHCHECK (May 5, 2020), https://www.pathcheck.org/en/blog/adding-location-
context-to-apple-google-exposure-notification-bluetooth-api-mit-safepaths-
encryption-proposals-for-gps-bluetooth.  When this announcement came out, I was 
working with a group of researchers from Case Western Reserve University and the 
University College London on a proposal to integrate the Google-Apple Bluetooth tool 
into an app designed to collect location, self-reported symptoms and other information 
using a completely different set of privacy controls to create a sophisticated risk score.  
Our proposal anticipated incorporating the Apple-Google Bluetooth system to provide 
proximity information interoperable with other apps.  See Ayday et al., supra note 33, 
at 11. 
 58 See, e.g., Erin Simpson & Adam Conner, Digital Contact Tracing to Contain the 
Coronavirus, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS: TECH. POL’Y (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.american
progress.org/issues/technology-policy/news/2020/04/22/483521/digital-contact-
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These strict limits were both driven by and reinforced the puzzling 
consensus among many privacy experts that location information would 
not be useful for digital contact tracing.  Ignoring recommendations by 
leading public health organizations, several institutions including the 
World Health Organization and the European Data Protection Board 
issued guidelines asserting that contact tracing apps do not require and 
should not collect location information.59  
Beyond the direct effect on alternative apps hoping to use their 
system, Google’s and Apple’s announcements focused attention on a 
single tech-company-created paradigm for using digital contact tracing.  
This had three negative consequences.  First, public concerns about 
these companies’ past privacy practices and domineering use of their 
control of the mobile technology market raised suspicion that this was 
yet another attempt to exploit consumer data for profit.60  Many press 
accounts simply ignored the privacy protections the system 
incorporated in favor of highlighting mistrust in big tech and incorrectly 
implying that the system would give these companies increased access 
to valuable health information when in fact their strict policy prohibited 
apps from sharing any information with them.61  Indeed, when both 
tracing-contain-coronavirus (stating that Google’s and Apple’s announcements in 
practice means their “standard is now the sole viable foundation for a contact tracing 
app”); Reed Albergotti & Drew Harwell, Apple and Google Are Building a Virus-Tracking 
System. Health Officials Say It Will Be Practically Useless, WASH. POST (May 15, 2020, 3:22 
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/05/15/app-apple-google-
virus (Apple and Google’s announcement “sparked a wave of excitement” about 
potential to use to collect necessary information including location data). 
 59 See JEFFREY KAHN ET AL., DIGITAL CONTACT TRACING FOR PANDEMIC RESPONSE 2 (Jeffrey 
Kahn ed., 2020) (recommending that apps provide users with “easy mechanisms and 
prompts to allow for opting-in to” providing location information); WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION, CGU Digital Proximity Tracking Contact, ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS TO GUIDE 
THE USE OF DIGITAL PROXIMITY TRACKING TECHNOLOGIES FOR COVID-19 CONTACT TRACING, 3 (May 
28, 2020) [hereinafter WHO], https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-2019-
nCoV-Ethics_Contact_tracing_apps-2020.1 (“data collection should not require the 
identity or location data of a user, or a time stamp of a proximity event”); EUR. DATA PROT.
BD., GUIDELINES 04/2020 ON THE USE OF LOCATION DATA AND CONTACT TRACING TOOLS IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE COVID-19 OUTBREAK, 7 (Apr. 21, 2020) [hereinafter EDPB], 
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_20200420_conta
ct_tracing_covid_with_annex_en.pdf (“[C]ontact tracing apps do not require tracking the 
location of individual users. Instead, proximity data should be used.”). 
 60 See Jessica Rich, How Our Outdated Privacy Laws Doomed Contact-Tracing Apps, 
BROOKINGS INST.: TECHTANK (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/
2021/01/28/how-our-outdated-privacy-laws-doomed-contact-tracing-apps (arguing 
that “Americans just weren’t persuaded” by Apple and Google’s privacy measures); Mike 
Feibus, Are Coronavirus Contact Tracing Apps Doomed to Fail in America?, USA TODAY 
(June 24, 2020, 3:46 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/2020/
06/24/apple-google-contact-tracing-apps-privacy/3253088001. 
61 See Halper, supra note 55; See Google Partner, supra note 56. 
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companies incorporated the Bluetooth function into an operating 
system update, it caused alarm among many of their customers and 
prompted a widespread rumor that the companies secretly installed a 
“COVID-19 sensor” on their phones.62  
Rather than praising the privacy-above-all approach of the Google-
Apple system, press accounts and analyses by privacy advocates often 
described the system as posing substantial risks.63  As late as September 
2020, the Electronic Frontier Foundation criticized California legislators 
for considering adopting the Google-Apple system, warning them not to 
trust the tech giants’ offer to create a pilot program free of charge 
because often services “offered for ‘free’ are paid for through the 
surrender of sensitive personal information.”64  In an ironic twist, many 
of those same analyses also cited the same technical constraints used to 
protect privacy—the unreliability of using Bluetooth, the need for large-
scale adoption and the limits of exposure notification compared to 
traditional contact tracing—to argue that the system was unlikely to 
work.65 
Second, Google’s and Apple’s announcements that they were 
limiting their systems to Bluetooth-based exposure notification 
effectively shut down any discussion of connecting digital contact 
tracing apps with other promising approaches to use multiple data 
sources in the pandemic response.66  Early in the pandemic, many 
groups recommended using various information sources, including 
location information to help scale manual contact tracing.  In April 2020, 
Johns Hopkins’ Bloomberg School of Public Health and the Association 
 62 See, e.g., Feibus, supra note 60; David Murphy, No, Your Phone Doesn’t Have a 
‘COVID-19 Sensor,’ LIFEHACKER (Aug. 18, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://vitals.lifehacker.com/
no-your-phone-doesnt-have-a-covid-19-sensor-1844750938; Rich DeMuro, Yes, 
Coronavirus Tracking Was Installed on Your Phone.  No, It’s Not Doing Anything (Just Yet), 
KTLA5 (Jul. 3, 2020, 8:58 AM), https://ktla.com/morning-news/technology/covid-
tracking-iphone-android-update.  
 63 See, e.g., ALBERT FOX CAHN & JOHN YANY VEISZLEMLEIN, STOP: SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY 
OVERSIGHT PROJECT, BEWARE: BLUETOOTH AHEAD 4–7 (2020) (critiquing Google-Apple 
system); Bennet Cyphers & Gennie Gebhart, Apple and Google’s COVID-19 Exposure 
Notification API: Questions and Answers, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 28, 2020), (available 
at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/04/apple-and-googles-covid-19-exposure-
notification-api-questions-and-answersanswers) (listing privacy concerns and 
questioning whether the system will work). 
 64 Hayley Tsukuyama, California Still Needs Privacy Protections for COVID Tracking 
Apps, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/09/
california-still-needs-privacy-protections-covid-tracking-apps. 
 65 See, e.g., CAHN & VEISZLEMLEIN, supra note 63, at 7–9; Cyphers and Gebhart, supra 
note 63. 
 66 See, e.g., Project Aurora: A New Open Source Solution for the Google Apple Exposure 
Notification API, PATHCHECK FOUND. BLOG (May 20, 2020), https://www.pathcheck.org/
en/blog/a-new-open-source-solution-for-the-google-apple-exposure-notification-api. 
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of State and Territorial Health Officials issued a joint report that called 
for using mobile contact tracing applications to collect contacts, location 
and self-reported symptoms.67  That same month the Center for 
American Progress issued a comprehensive national and state plan for 
coronavirus response that recommended adopting tools for 
instantaneous contact tracing similar to South Korea’s and Singapore’s, 
which used “GPS, Bluetooth, cell tower and Wi-Fi networks” but with 
stronger protections for civil liberties.68 
In May 2020, another research group issued a comprehensive set 
of recommendations for digital contact tracing.  These 
recommendations emphasized that contact tracing apps should 
incorporate flexible design principles to allow for collection of new 
information as our understanding of the disease evolves and to permit 
users to opt into providing location information.69  
Harvard’s Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics likewise noted that 
groups developing apps were increasingly moving toward 
incorporating a common Bluetooth architecture as the backbone for 
apps with a range of functions that would send “other information (such 
as personal information and GPS data)” to public health authorities.70  In 
a similar vein, dozens of engineers, executives and epidemiologists 
issued an open letter calling on a range of technology companies to do 
more to address the pandemic.  One of their thirteen recommendations 
was that Apple and Google should provide a privacy-preserving 
operating system function for contact tracing that included location 
information.71  Citing the success of China and South Korea in 
conducting large-scale tracing, they called for the feature to allow users 
who opt in to determine if they had been in the same locations as 
subsequently identified cases.72  
 67 CRYSTAL WATSON ET AL., JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH: CTR. FOR HEALTH 
SEC., A NATIONAL PLAN TO ENABLE COMPREHENSIVE COVID-19 CASE FINDING AND CONTACT 
TRACING IN THE US 6 (2020), https://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/our-work/pubs_
archive/pubs-pdfs/2020/200410-national-plan-to-contact-tracing.pdf. 
 68 Zeke Emanuel et al., A National and State Plan To End the Coronavirus Crisis, 
CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/healthcare/news/2020/04/03/482613/national-state-plan-end-coronavirus-
crisis. 
69 KAHN ET AL., supra note 59, at 2–3, 7–10. 
 70 VI HART ET AL., OUTPACING THE VIRUS: DIGITAL RESPONSE TO CONTAINING THE SPREAD OF 
COVID-19 WHILE MITIGATING PRIVACY RISKS, EDMOND J. SAFRA CTR. FOR ETHICS 23 (Apr. 3, 
2020), https://ethics.harvard.edu/outpacing-virus. 
71 Peter Eckersley et al., 13 Things Tech Companies Can Do To Fight Coronavirus: An 
Open Letter From Technologists, Epidemiologists & Medical Professionals, TECH VS COVID-
19 (Apr. 2020), https://stop-covid.tech. 
72 Id. 
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The ACLU issued a set of recommendations for how policymakers 
should evaluate the potential use of tracking technologies to combat the 
epidemic.  While emphasizing the need for caution, the report 
acknowledged that “[t]he challenges posed by COVID-19 are 
extraordinary, and we should consider with an open mind any and all 
measures that might help contain the virus consistent with our 
fundamental principles.”73  Specifically, under the right circumstances 
and with appropriate protections, “using certain forms of data 
generated by cell phones—such as location histories or records of 
proximity to other devices—might make sense.”74 
Third, Google’s and Apple’s requirements that each jurisdiction 
sponsor a single app, as well as the aggressive pressure they placed on 
governments already moving forward with alternatives to abandon 
those systems in favor of theirs, while intended to encourage user 
adoption, may have had the opposite effect.  Most of the dominant 
network-dependent apps widely used today launched in small 
communities, developed broad adoption in those communities, and 
scaled from there.75  Many of the groups developing alternative 
approaches were planning to pilot their apps in precisely that way both 
to test and refine how they work and to generate trust within local 
communities.76  
Finally, a lesser-noticed but even more troubling aspect of Google’s 
and Apple’s approaches is the startlingly comprehensive control they 
were able to exert over public health responses across the world.77  They 
 73 JAY STANLEY & JENNIFER STISA GRANICK, ACLU, THE LIMITS OF LOCATION TRACKING IN AN 




 75 See Chiara Farronato et al., How To Get People to Actually Use Contact-Tracing 
Apps, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 15, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/07/how-to-get-people-to-
actually-use-contact-tracing-apps. 
76 For example, the ShareTrace group that I worked with submitted a proposal to 
the National Institutes of Health proposing to pilot the app in one Northeast Ohio suburb 
and had started discussions with two local universities and one large health 
organization.  Safe Paths had agreements with several local governments and non-
profits to pilot their app.  See, e.g., Brian Kanerline, KC Business Leaders, Companies Lead 
EBusiness Leaders, Companies Lead Effort to do Widespread COVID Contact Tracing, KAN. 
CITY BUS. J. (May 9, 2020), https://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/news/2020/05/
09/executives-companies-lead-contact-tracing-effort.html (describing coalition of 
community groups “putting together a campaign to sell the public on using the Safe 
Paths app”). 
 77 Among the few commentaries that have highlighted this issue to date include 
Tamar Sharon, Blind-Sided by Privacy? Digital Contact Tracing, the Apple/Google API and 
Big Tech’s Newfound Role as Global Health Policy Makers, ETHICS & INFO. TECH. (2020), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7368642. 
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forced several governments, including France, Germany, and the UK, to 
abandon their plans for digital contact tracing in favor of the limited 
Google-Apple system.78  Many of these governments planned to pilot 
different designs with alternative approaches to privacy.79  Even 
observers who generally approved of the Google-Apple system’s privacy 
protections expressed dismay at the companies’ brazen assertion of 
monopolistic power to dictate public health responses to the 
pandemic.80 
IV. PANDEMIC PRIVACY
A.  Context 
Privacy depends on context.81  Here that context starts with a 
highly infectious, often deadly disease that has killed millions of people, 
closed schools and universities, and wrought massive economic 
damage.  In the U.S., common law rules and privacy laws have treated 
communicable diseases like COVID-19 as a special circumstance that 
justifies entrusting health authorities with rights to use sensitive data to 
protect the public.82  Many jurisdictions even affirmatively require—
 78 See Alex Webb, Apple and Google Face Off Against Europe Over Contact Tracing, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK (May 18, 2020, 12:01 AM), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2020-05-18/apple-and-google-face-off-against-europe-over-contact-tracing; Douglas 
Busvine & Andreas Rinke, Germany Flips to Apple-Google Approach on Smartphone 
Contact Tracing, REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2020, 3:51 AM), www.reuters.com/article/us-health-
coronavirus-europe-tech/germany-flips-to-apple-google-approach-on-smartphone-
contact-tracing-idUSKCN22807J; Leo Kelion, Coronavirus: Apple and France in Stand-Off 
Over Contact-Tracing App, BBC NEWS (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/
technology-52366129. 
 79 See Ieva Ilves, Why Are Google and Apple Dictating How European Democracies 
Fight Coronavirus?, THE GUARDIAN (June 16, 2020, 4:00 PM), https://www.the
guardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jun/16/google-apple-dictating-european-
democracies-coronavirus. 
 80 See, e.g., id.; Michael Veale, Privacy is Not the Problem with the Apple-Google 
Contact-Tracing Toolkit, THE GUARDIAN (July 1, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://www.the
guardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jul/01/apple-google-contact-tracing-app-tech-
giant-digital-rights.  
 81 See, e.g., Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119 
(2004).  Nissenbaum applies this framework specifically to digital contact tracing tools 
in her presentation at Simons Institute, Perspectives on Digital Contact Tracing, YOUTUBE 
(July 20, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9J3s4h80Kxw.  Nissenbaum 
argues that the Google-Apple system prioritized privacy at the expense of legitimate 
public health objectives.  Id. at 38:00–41:25 min. 
 82 See, e.g., Polly J. Price, Ebola and the Law in the United States: A Short Guide to 
Public Health Authority and Practical Limits 5–13 (Emory Univ. Sch. of L. Res. Paper 
Series, Research Paper No. 14-299, 2015) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2538187) (describing state and federal laws and application to 
Ebola); State Quarantine and Isolation Statutes, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 7, 
2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-quarantine-and-isolation-
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under the threat of civil or criminal penalties—that health care 
professionals and patients notify others who may be at risk of 
contracting a communicable disease.83  Likewise, state and federal laws 
long have provided health authorities with extraordinary information-
gathering powers to combat infectious disease, including repurposing 
consumer data collection methods like grocery loyalty cards and even 
credit card records to identify individuals at risk of contracting deadly 
diseases.84 
The context also includes longstanding norms and practices related 
to the inherently intrusive manual contact tracing process.85  That 
process involves collecting private and often sensitive information to 
identify every location a patient may have visited and every person he 
or she may have come into close contact with over the roughly two-
week period when the patient likely was infectious.  Standardized 
disease reporting guidance provides that for suspected COVID-19 cases, 
health authorities should gather and report, among other things, patient 
demographics, detailed symptoms, and all known contacts or linkages 
to COVID-19 cases.86  To collect this information, contact tracers ask 
infected people detailed questions about where they have been and who 
they have met while they were contagious to identify other potential 
cases quickly.87  
To assist in containing deadly diseases, health authorities routinely 
use multiple data sources outside of manual contact tracing, including 
individual consumer data.  The Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC)’s website on foodborne illness explicitly calls on 
health authorities and food companies to use information from 
statutes.aspx; DANIELLE ALLEN ET AL., SECURING JUSTICE, HEALTH AND DEMOCRACY AGAINST THE
COVID-19 THREAT, EDMOND J. SAFRA CTR. FOR ETHICS 11–17 (Mar. 24, 2020), 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/18ZEiscW_zHgyEn3-k_U2IJj7UgDhbi84/view. 
 83 See HIV and STD Criminalization Laws, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/policies/law/states/exposure.html. 
 84 Safer Food Saves Lives, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Nov. 3, 2015) 
[hereinafter Safer Food Saves Lives], https://bit.ly/3d8Wjnt; see Frederik T. Moller et al., 
Analysis of Consumer Food Purchase Data Used for Outbreak Investigations, A Review, 23 
EURO SUREVILLANCE, 1 (2018), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/29921346. 
 85 For an extensive analysis of the public health needs that digital contact tracing 
could assist in meeting, see KAHN ET AL., supra note 59, at 13–14.  
 86 COUNCIL OF  ST. AND TERRITORIAL EPIDEMIOLOGISTS, POSITION STATEMENT NO. INTERIM-20-
ID-02, UPDATE TO THE STANDARDIZED SURVEILLANCE CASE DEFINITION AND NATIONAL 
NOTIFICATION FOR 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS DISEASE (COVID-19) (2020), https://cdn.
ymaws.com/www.cste.org/resource/resmgr/ps/positionstatement2020/Interim-20-
ID-02_COVID-19.pdf. 
 87 Investigating a COVID-19 Case, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Nov. 23, 
2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/contact-tracing/contact-
tracing-plan/investigating-covid-19-case.html. 
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individual grocery loyalty cards to identify potential sources of 
confirmed salmonella and to notify other individuals who are at risk 
from consuming the same contaminated product.88  Likewise, the CDC’s 
detailed contact tracing guidelines for COVID-19 list “Google maps” and 
“social media/mobile apps” as recommended alternative sources of 
information to identify close contacts.89 
These general public health norms for communicable disease and 
the specific practices related to contact tracing, including the types of 
information collected, establish the context in which we should consider 
the privacy implications of digital tools to accomplish the same ends.90  
Discussing privacy in light of this context and taking into account the 
potential for digital health surveillance tools to slow the spread of 
disease appropriately recognizes both the risks and benefits of 
deploying them. 
B.  Google-Apple Exposure Notification and Safe Paths Privacy 
Comparison 
The key questions, then, are: (i) what new privacy risks do digital 
contact tracing tools pose compared to the information that health 
authorities already collect and (ii) are those risks acceptable in light of 
the potential benefits?  Comparing the potential risks and benefits of the 
Bluetooth-only Google-Apple system and the Safe Paths GPS-plus 
Bluetooth proposal in light of the context just described illustrates how 
one alternative to the dominant Apple-Google model could have 
increased the efficacy of digital contact tracing with very little increase 
in privacy risk to individual users. 
The Google-Apple system collects far less sensitive information 
than manual contact tracing.  The system records only rotating, 
anonymous identifiers and destroys those identifiers after fourteen 
days.  These identifiers stay on a user’s device until the user tests 
positive and consents to upload them to a central server controlled by a 
public health authority to alert other users who may have been exposed. 
88 Safer Food Saves Lives, supra note 84.  
 89 Case Investigation and Contact-Tracing Guidance, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, Appendix B (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
ncov/php/contact-tracing/contact-tracing-plan/appendix.html#tips. 
90 For an extended analysis of these issues from an ethics perspective see Michael J. 
Parker et al., Ethics of Instantaneous Contact Tracing Using Mobile Phone Apps in the 
Control of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 46 J. MED. ETHICS 427–31 (2020), https://jme.
bmj.com/content/medethics/46/7/427.full.pdf. 
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It is difficult, but not impossible, to re-identify an individual using 
those rotating identifiers.91  For example, a person with a Bluetooth-
enabled camera could use that device to capture identifiers broadcast 
by individuals in a specific location and simultaneously “root” their 
phone, which is running the app to let them see the Bluetooth identifiers 
of other users the camera is recording.  If one of those users later reports 
a positive COVID-19 diagnosis, the person doing the recording could 
match up the codes the user broadcast at the moment they passed the 
camera, identifying a stranger as COVID-19 positive.92  
This risk is real, but it is difficult to execute and impossible to scale.  
The camera attack is far less likely to identify someone than alternatives 
like directly surveilling known COVID-19 testing sites.  More 
importantly, the privacy risk it creates is minimal compared to the 
information routinely collected as part of manual contact tracing. 
The problem is that the Google-Apple system completely ignores 
the public health context in favor of protecting user privacy.  As one 
public health expert put it, the Google-Apple system “took out the most 
important piece, which was the location of where people were.”93  
Rather than addressing the specific needs of public health authorities in 
contact tracing and other processes, the system’s only potential value 
lies in its ability to alert some people with access to the right kind of 
device that they may have been exposed to an infected person.94  Even 
that potential requires relatively high adoption rates among the subset 
of people with phones capable of using the system and is subject to 
relatively high risk of false positives.  
The Safe Paths app proposed a system designed to interface 
directly with public health systems and processes, including manual 
contact tracing, using that same Bluetooth protocol and adding GPS 
 91 For a summary of the technical details regarding these risks see Russell Brandon, 
Answering the 12 Biggest Questions About Apple and Google’s New Coronavirus Tracking 
Project, THE VERGE (Apr. 11, 2020, 10:48 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/
4/11/21216803/apple-google-coronavirus-tracking-app-covid-bluetooth-secure. 
 92 See id.; Andy Greenberg, Does Covid-19 Contact Tracing Pose a Privacy Risk? Your 
Questions, Answered, WIRED (Apr. 17, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://bit.ly/3f1YICI. 
 93 Margaret Bourdeaux, Covid State of Play: Building a Public Sector Health 
Intelligence Capability, Berkman Klein Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y (Dec. 16, 2020), 
https://cyber.harvard.edu/events/covid-state-play-building-public-sector-health-
intelligence-capability. 
 94 For discussions of the need for apps to interface with public health authorities, 
see Margaret Boudreaux, et al., The Best Tech for Contact Tracing? Systems Designed for 
Healthcare Workers, 9 Interactions XXVII.4, 90 (July–Aug. 2020); see also, Nissenbaum, 
supra note 81, at 120.  
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location information and time.95  In the abstract, these additional pieces 
of information pose substantially more privacy risks than the Google-
Apple system because even a fourteen-day location history reveals 
sensitive details about a person to the health authority collecting that 
information.  But manual contact tracing collects that same information, 
and the privacy protections Safe Paths incorporates arguably better 
protects this information than that process.96  
Safe Paths poses two additional risks.  First, a person only provides 
location information in the manual contact tracing process after they 
have tested positive, whereas the Safe Paths app routinely collects and 
stores fourteen days of contacts.  Collecting and storing those contacts 
opens up users to the risk that someone could access those contacts at 
any time.  Second, users risk reidentification where health authorities 
use the de-identified and aggregated location to publish public heat 
maps that allow non-users to self-identify possible exposure.97  
Safe Paths includes several protections to mitigate both of those 
additional risks.  First, Safe Paths uses the same decentralized structure 
as the Google-Apple system storing both Bluetooth keys and location 
information directly on the user’s phone.  The system also proposed 
several alternatives for protecting sensitive GPS information from 
unauthorized access or reidentification.98  This combination of 
measures provides users complete control over the information the app 
collects; thus, minimizing any privacy risk during the collection process 
itself.  Notably, they also provide greater protections than many popular 
consumer applications that track location, including Google and Apple 
maps.99  Second, the Safe Places system allows health authorities to 
 95 See, e.g., Ananthaswamy, supra note 40; Raskar, Apps Gone Rogue, supra note 35; 
Covid SafePaths, supra note 19, at 20–23 (emphasizing need for apps to work with public 
health authorities and describing benefits of that collaboration).  
 96 See Alex Berke et al., Assessing Disease Exposure Risk with Location Data: A 
Proposal for Cryptographic Preservation of Privacy, MIT MEDIA LAB, Mar. 31, 2020, at 6–
9, https://arxiv.org/pdf/2003.14412.pdf; see also Ananthaswamy, supra note 40. 
 97 See Adding Location Context, supra note 21 (describing threats and identifying 
solutions). 
 98 See PATHCHECK, “GPS+ Solution,” PATHCHECK FOUNDATION [hereinafter GPS+], 
https://www.pathcheck.org/en/technology/gps-digital-contact-tracing-solution; 
Raskar, Apps Gone Rogue, supra note 35, at 6.  Safe Paths proposed several alternatives 
for storing the GPS information, including: (1) logging direct GPS information but 
without visualization to prevent casual unauthorized access by nosy co-workers, 
spouses or employers; or (2) “blurring” GPS information based on population density 
and storing only that less precise location also without visualization.  It also requires 
users affirmatively to consent to upload that information to a public health authority-
maintained server.  See Adding Location Context, supra note 21. 
 99 See ME AND MY SHADOW, Location Tracking, (Feb. 15, 2017), https://my
shadow.org/location-tracking. 
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redact any location that a user does not want included in the aggregated 
database.  It also is set up to delete the raw individual data and to 
aggregate that de-identified information.100 
In spite of these protections, by allowing users to provide raw 
location information directly to a public health authority the Safe Paths 
app poses a more significant privacy risk to users than the Google-Apple 
app.  Using the app to collect this information, however, does not 
substantially increase the risk that manual contact tracing poses 
because a user provides location information to health authorities 
through that process.  Once the raw data is destroyed through Safe 
Places, no new personal information is retained. 
The concern most often identified over collecting location 
information with these apps is the risk of surveillance creep.  Safe Paths’ 
decentralized structure largely eliminates that concern.  Rather than 
creating a new large-scale centralized database, the Safe Paths system 
stores that information on users’ phones.  Law enforcement authorities 
still could seek to access the records of individuals who test positive and 
share their stored location data with health authorities.  The Safe Places 
system accounts for that risk by providing tools for health authorities to 
delete the raw data after it is de-identified and aggregated with other 
users.  
While it is certainly possible with some additional information to 
connect an individual to one or more specific locations, it would be 
difficult to use the aggregated data to recreate a single person’s location 
history or do anything else that is likely to provide useful information in 
a law enforcement investigation.101  It would be much easier to gather 
the same and much more information from other sources, including 
manual contact tracing databases, which maintain records connected to 
each individual.  Indeed, as Stewart Baker wryly observed “any 
authoritarian government worth its salt could get far more location and 
contact data simply by subpoenaing Google’s adtech files” than it could 
even from a digital contact tracing database that stored location records 
connected to each person, much less one like Safe Paths that stores only 
aggregated data.102  
100 See GPS+, supra note 98; PathCheck Github, supra note 37. 
 101 See, e.g., Alsdurf et al., supra note 33, at 17–20 (describing in detail reidentification 
and other threats for decentralized contact tracing). 
102 Stewart Baker, The Problem With Google and Apple’s COVID-19-Tracking Plan, 
LAWFARE, (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/problem-google-and-apples-
covid-19-tracking-plan.  Indeed, Google and several ad tech companies that aggregate 
location data already shares that information with public health officials and 
researchers as part of their coronavirus response efforts.  See GOOGLE, COVID-19 
Community Mobility Reports, https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/; PRIVACY 
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The point in analyzing Safe Paths closely is not to argue that it was 
the best model for digital contact tracing.  Indeed, there was an active 
debate over whether the privacy benefits of a largely decentralized 
model system were worth the efficiency and efficacy tradeoffs.103  The 
Safe Paths example simply illustrates that Google’s and Apple’s 
decisions to impose a single privacy model cut off even highly privacy 
protective but still potentially more useful alternatives.  It also ended 
the progress they were making to pilot and test those options with 
several communities.  
The next Section first explains how adding only location 
information with the privacy protections Safe Paths incorporated could 
have been more effective than the Google-Apple model.  It then explores 
how other types of information have the potential to make these apps 
even more powerful tools and how some of that information is critical 
to evaluating whether these tools are working and how they are 
affecting different communities.  Here, again, the claim is not that any of 
these possibilities definitively would have worked, only that the rush to 
install a single, uniformly limited design prevented even responsible 
experimentation with them.   
C.  Efficacy and Effectiveness 
Health researchers carefully distinguish between the efficacy and 
effectiveness of new interventions.104  Efficacy reflects how well an 
intervention works under controlled, ideal conditions whereas 
effectiveness measures its performance in the real world.105  Critiques 
of the efficacy of digital contact tracing apps typically focus on the 
Google-Apple system and often involve a catch-22: they start with 
assuming (or insisting on) the set of privacy controls those companies 
have imposed to radically limit the information the apps can collect and 
INTERNATIONAL, US State and Local Authorities Strike Deals With Location Data Companies, 
(June 15, 2020), https://privacyinternational.org/examples/4008/us-state-and-local-
authorities-strike-deals-location-data-companies (noting that “Apple’s and Google’s 
refusal to allow contact tracing apps using their system to access location services on 
users’ phones creates an opportunity for these data providers”). 
 103 See Joseph Duball, Centralized vs. Decentralized: EU’s Contact Tracing Privacy 
Conundrum, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRIVACY PROFESSIONALS (Apr. 28, 2020), 
https://iapp.org/news/a/centralized-vs-decentralized-eus-contact-tracing-privacy-
conundrum. 
 104 See Amit G. Singal et al., A Primer on Effectiveness and Efficacy Trials, 5 CLINICAL AND 
TRANSLATIONAL GASTROENTEROLOGY 1 (2014). 
105 Id. at 1. 
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what health authorities can do with it and then conclude that this tightly 
handcuffed system is unlikely to work.106 
Recent studies have used proxies to estimate that even apps using 
the extremely limited Google-Apple system are working better than 
critics predicted.107  The Safe Paths example illustrates how 
incorporating even modest additional information into digital contact 
tracing applications increases their efficacy in combating the pandemic 
by making them useful to public health authorities as well as users in 
several ways.108  The ability to collect even that modest but critical 
location information would allow us to test the system’s effectiveness 
and tailor it to work better in future iterations.  Collecting modest 
additional information, including demographic information, would 
allow analyses of whether and how the app is helping or harming 
specific communities, including those hit hardest by the disease.109 
Contrary to what several analyses assert, combining location data 
with Bluetooth is far more useful than relying solely on Bluetooth.110  
First, it allows for more accurate assessments of exposure.111  Second, 
 106 See, e.g., Ashkan Soltani et al., Contact-Tracing Apps Are Not a Solution to the 
COVID-19 Crisis, BROOKINGS TECH STREAM (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/
techstream/inaccurate-and-insecure-why-contact-tracing-apps-could-be-a-disaster 
(critiquing the Google-Apple system). 
 107 See Malcolm Owen, UK Apple-Google COVID-19 App Credited for Prevention of 
600,000 Infections, APPLEINSIDER, (Feb. 9, 2021), https://appleinsider.com/articles/21/
02/09/uk-apple-google-covid-19-app-credited-for-prevention-of-600000-infections. 
 108 See Ramesh Raskar et al., Contact Tracing: Holistic Solution Beyond Bluetooth, 
https://github.com/PrivateKit/PrivacyDocuments/
blob/master/ContactTracingBeyondBluetooth.pdf; COVID SAFE PATHS, COVID-19 Contact-
Tracing Mobile Apps: Evaluation and Assessment for Decisionmakers, https://git
hub.com/PrivateKit/PrivacyDocuments/blob/master/apps-evaluation.pdf; Maria 
Barsallo Lynch & Lauren Zabierek, Considerations for Digital Contact Tracing Tools for 
COVID-19 Mitigation: Recommendations for Stakeholders and Policymakers, BELFER CTR. 
FOR SCI. AND INT’L AFF. 15 (June 2020), https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/
considerations-digital-contact-tracing-tools-covid-19-mitigation-recommendations#
toc-3-3-0 (noting that Bluetooth exposure notification and location services “may 
complement each other and yield a more effective solution for contact tracing,” but the 
Google-Apple system prohibits it).  
109 See Anasthswamy, supra note 40. 
 110 Margaret Bourdeaux put this most succinctly when she noted that “[Google and 
Apple] took out the most important piece, which was the location of where people were.”  
Bourdeaux, supra note 93; see also KAHN ET AL., supra note 59, at 2 (recommending that 
contact tracing apps permit users to opt into location tracking).  For examples of 
analyses stating that location data is unnecessary see WHO, supra note 59 and EDPB, 
supra note 59. 
111 See Holistic Solution, supra note 19; Nancy A. Fairbank et al., There’s an App for 
That: Digital Contact Tracing and Its Role in Mitigating a Second Wave, at 13–14, 
https://cyber.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/2020-05/Contact_Tracing_Report_
Final.pdf; Kostubh “K.J.” Bhagchi et al., Digital Tools for COVID-19 Contact Tracing: 
Identifying and Mitigating the Equity, Privacy, and Civil Liberties Concerns, Edmond J. 
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an app that collects location information requires lower adoption rates 
for the app to work.112  Finally, it makes the apps directly useful for 
traditional contact tracing and provides information that health 
authorities could aggregate and use to better target scarce resources 
and refine their understanding of how the disease spreads and who is 
most at risk.113  
One of the most significant hurdles for any app is adoption rate. 
Several surveys have shown a marked reluctance among Americans to 
use these apps.114  Privacy concerns clearly play a substantial role in this 
reluctance, but at least one study suggests that in the U.S. people are 
somewhat more concerned with an app’s effectiveness than with 
privacy, although both issues were likely to result in lower adoption 
rates.115  It makes sense that the public is more likely to trust and use a 
more robust tool that is more accurate and effective while still 
protecting user privacy. 
Equally important, adding location and other information, such as 
symptoms and health data, could make these apps useful at much lower 
adoption rates for several reasons.  First, a system like Safe Paths could 
be used to assist in manual contact tracing and for the other functions 
like identifying emerging hotspots.116  Second, these functions also make 
the apps useful for a much larger range of people, including those with 
older phones unable to use the Google-Apple system.117 
Beyond identifying individual cases, health officials have used 
machine learning and other data analytics tools to trace the source or 
model the likely future spread of infectious diseases.118  These tools are 
especially valuable for outbreaks caused by new diseases, like COVID-
19, where we lack information about how the disease spreads and what 
factors put individuals at risk.119  Critically, these data analytics tools 
Safra Center for Ethics, COVID-19 Rapid Response Initiative White Paper 22, July 2, 
2020, at 11–12. 
112 See Holistic Solution, supra note 19. 
113 See Bourdeaux, supra note 93, Podcast Transcript at 7–9. 
114 See Kaptchuk et al., supra note 30.  
115 Id. 
116 See id.; Holistic Solution, supra note 19. 
117 See Alex Berke et al., Assessing Disease Exposure Risk with Location Data: A 
Proposal for Cryptographic Preservation of Privacy, MIT MEDIA LAB, Mar. 2020, at 3. 
 118 See Zheng et al., Artificial Intelligence–Enabled Public Health Surveillance—from 
Local Detection to Global Epidemic Monitoring and Control, Art. Intell. in Med. 437 
(2021), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7484813. 
 119 See Bourdeaux, supra note 93, at 7–8, (“Relying on digital data sources, such as 
data from mobile phones and other digital devices, is of particular value in outbreaks 
caused by newly discovered pathogens, for which official data and reliable forecasts are 
still scarce.”); Marcello Ienca and Effy Vayena, On The Responsible Use of Digital Data to 
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have been used in the current pandemic to help triage allocation of 
scarce resources to vulnerable communities most at risk from the 
disease.   
As one data science expert explained recently, combining contact 
tracing-related apps with these powerful analytic tools could make 
them valuable well beyond alerting users about their own potential 
exposure.120  This is because tracking apps can provide the granular, 
real-time information about who is contracting the disease, where they 
live, and what symptoms they are experiencing; these advanced tools 
need to more quickly and precisely identify how the disease spreads, 
especially among people and communities at higher risk.121  That same 
information could improve pandemic response in a range of other ways, 
including quickly tracking the real-time effects of different policy 
decisions like re-opening schools and restaurants.122  These potential 
applications, when combined with statistical modeling, also require 
much lower adoption rates to work.123 
Integrating these apps with data provided by other tools like 
mobile fitness apps creates even more potential for this kind of 
synergistic analysis.  The health wearable studies cited at the beginning 
of this Article show the tremendous potential for repurposing the 
information existing devices already collect.124  Notably, both studies 
demonstrated that aggregating information allowed for much faster 
diagnoses even in asymptomatic patients.125  This provides a potential 
solution to the problem of testing shortages by offering an alternative.  
Adding location information could make the notifications even more 
accurate by reducing the number of false positives for individuals.   
Layering additional information also has the potential to refine our 
understanding of when a person who has contracted the disease safely 
can return to work or school.  One study found that using what the 
researchers call risk-based quarantine—essentially incorporating 
symptom monitoring for individuals with a common exposure source 
Tackle the COVID-19 Pandemic, 26 NATURE MED. 463, 463 (2020), available at 
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-020-0832-5.  
 120 Kimon Drakopoulos, The Logic Around Contact Tracing Apps Is All Wrong, WIRED 
(Aug. 13, 2020). https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-the-logic-around-contact-
tracing-apps-is-all-wrong/. 
 121 See Andrew Curtis et al., Geographic Monitoring for Early Disease Detection 




124 See supra Part I. 
125 See Hirten et al., supra note 1; Mishra et al., supra note 2. 
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into manual contact tracing—is potentially more effective than single-
test release protocols.126  Another study found that using a mobile self-
reporting symptom tracking app predicted the emergence of new 
hotspots five to seven days earlier than relying on public health 
reports.127   
These broader possibilities for using data collected through these 
apps and other tools to better understand this disease and identify more 
effective responses outside of simple tracking and tracing highlights the 
costs of applying a one-size-fits-all set of privacy controls to them.  
Several recent studies have concluded that the use of more robust digital 
surveillance tools in other countries has both saved lives and mitigated 
the devastating economic effects of the pandemic.  One retrospective 
comparison of six countries’ different use of digital tools as part of their 
pandemic response efforts concluded that “early intervention with the 
use of digital tools had a strong correlation with the successful 
containment of COVID-19.”128  Likewise, a National Bureau of Economic 
Research study of South Korea’s broad-based use of digital tools found 
the tools likely saved thousands of lives and substantially mitigated the 
economic effects of the pandemic by avoiding costly lockdowns.129  A 
similar study of China’s extensive use of mobile-phone location data 
reached similar conclusions.130 
The point of citing those studies is not to argue that the pandemic 
justifies wholesale adoption of these more intrusive measures.  Indeed, 
the protections Part V outlines would preclude many of them.  Rather, 
these studies suggest that allowing apps to collect—and health 
authorities to use—more information than mere Bluetooth proximity 
data could make these apps more useful.131  
Notably, some of the apps using the Google-Apple system have 
implicitly recognized these benefits by finding ways to incorporate 
some limited additional data within the tight restrictions these 
 126 Andrew Perrault et al., Designing Efficient Contact Tracing Through Risk-Based 
Quarantining 14 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 28135, 2020).  
 127 David A. Drew et al., Rapid Implementation of Mobile Technology for Real-Time 
Epidemiology of COVID-19, Science, 368 SCIENCE 1362, 1366 (2020), https://science.
sciencemag.org/content/368/6497/1362/tab-pdf. 
 128 Kylie Zeng et al., The Use of Digital Tools to Mitigate the COVID-19 Pandemic: 
Comparative Retrospective Study of Six Countries, 6 JMIR PUB. HEALTH SURVEILL. 4, 4 
(2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7759507/?report=printable. 
 129 David O. Argente et al., The Cost of Privacy: Welfare Effects of the Disclosure of 
COVID-19 Cases, NBER Working Paper 27220, available at, https://www.nber.org/
system/files/working_papers/w27220/w27220.pdf 
 130 Kairong Xiao, The Value of Big Data in a Pandemic, Manuscript at 2, 9, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3583919. 
131 See Bourdeaux, supra note 93.  
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companies have imposed.  For example, the UK app has added two 
limited forms of location information.  First, users are required to input 
their postcode and identify their local authority when registering to 
allow local authorities to provide specific advice and support, and also 
to permit analysis of the app’s effectiveness.132 
Second, the app has incorporated an indirect form of location 
tracking by allowing users to scan official QR codes posted on some 
public venues and store those codes on the device for 21 days.133  The 
app does this for precisely the same reasons that Safe Paths proposed 
permitting users to store their own location data but in a far more 
cumbersome and less effective way.  Rather than allowing users to take 
advantage of the same location logging functions they already often use 
to provide that information to consumer apps, the system requires them 
to remember to look for QR codes in places they visit and then physically 
scan those codes with their phones.  
It also appears that, rather than integrating this with the Bluetooth 
keys to create an integrated risk score as Safe Paths and others 
proposed, this function operates in parallel so that users who opt into 
both may receive separate proximity alerts and venue-based alerts.134  
Public health authorities and researchers also cannot access this 
information to refine the system or better understand the disease.  
Instead, they are left attempting to draw indirect inferences even for 
very basic data points that direct location logging easily could 
provide.135  
By creating an interoperable design standard for Bluetooth 
exposure notification, Google and Apple could have facilitated the 
development of these more powerful alternatives.  Indeed, many people 
involved in developing apps applauded their announcement as an 
 132 See UK Dept. of Health & Social Care, NHS COVID-19 App: Data Protection Impact 
Assessment, GOV.UK (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
nhs-covid-19-app-privacy-information/nhs-covid-19-app-data-protection-impact-
assessment (describing all of the app’s functions, including “addition of local 
authorities,” and reasons for these new functions). 
 133 Id.; see also Briers, et al., supra note 32 (explaining that the QR code “feature allows 
health officials to send venue alerts and advice to users, and for users to keep a private 
and secure digital log of the places that they have visited, should they ever need to report 
this information to contact tracers”). 
134 See UK Dept. of Health & Social Care, supra note 132. 
 135 See Briers et al., supra note 32.  This report describes the very sophisticated tools 
researchers have used to attempt to assess how the system is working.  In one 
particularly telling example, the researchers note that they “have just finished producing 
preliminary research into the potential for a mobile device to infer whether an encounter 
takes place indoors or outdoors. This information could help to inform the risk 
calculation, and potentially wider public policy.” (emphasis added). 
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opportunity for the apps in development to work off a universal, 
interoperable core.136  By strictly limiting apps using this tool from 
collecting any other information, Google and Apple effectively 
foreclosed the possibility of experimenting with both collecting 
different combinations of information, except in the highly attenuated 
ways the UK example illustrates, as well as alternative privacy models 
for protecting that information.  
D.  Equity 
Beyond privacy and effectiveness, another important set of 
concerns with using smartphone apps is that they risk exacerbating the 
already deeply inequitable effects of the pandemic on marginalized 
communities.137  To start, the Google-Apple system depends on owning 
an expensive smartphone and consistent internet access.  Recent 
studies estimate that up to 2 billion of the 3.5 billion phones in use 
across the globe will be unable to use this system.138  
Even for people with access to smartphones capable of running the 
Google-Apple system, the risk of a false positive notification is greater 
for many marginalized communities and the consequences potentially 
more severe for several reasons.139  The disease is more widespread in 
these communities.140  Racial minorities, and Black Americans in 
particular, are more likely to live in denser spaces, including apartments 
and multi-family units, and are overrepresented essential jobs with 
large numbers of interactions, including frontline healthcare workers, 
grocery stores, and fast-food restaurants.141  The unnecessary 
quarantine that could result from a false positive also is more likely to 
 136 See, e.g., SafePaths Alliance, Adding Location Context to Apple/Google Exposure 
Notification Bluetooth API: MIT SafePaths Encryption Proposals for GPS + Bluetooth, 
PATHCHECK FOUND. (May 5, 2020), https://www.pathcheck.org/en/blog/adding-
location-context-to-apple-google-exposure-notification-bluetooth-api-mit-safepaths-
encryption-proposals-for-gps-bluetooth; ShareTrace, supra note 33, at 4–5, 11.  
 137 See Delan Devakumar et al., Racism and Discrimination in COVID-19 Responses, 395 
LANCET 1194, 1194 (2020). 
 138 Tim Bradshaw, 2 Billion Phones Cannot Use Google and Apple Contact-Tracing 
Tech, ARS TECHNICA (April 20, 2020), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2020/04/2-
billion-phones-cannot-use-google-and-apple-contract-tracing-tech. 
 139 See, e.g., Devakumar et al., supra note 137, at 1194; Susan Landau, et. al., The 
Importance of Equity in Contact Tracing, LAWFARE (May 1, 2020), https://www.law
fareblog.com/importance-equity-contact-tracing. 
140 See Devakumar et al., supra note 137, at 1194. 
 141 See Adam Nagy, What Digital Contact Tracing Can Teach Us About Public Trust, 
Health Equity, and Governance in the United States, MEDIUM (Oct. 29, 2020), 
https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/what-digital-contact-tracing-can-teach-
us-about-public-trust-health-equity-and-governance-in-the-510ce5f2c6f6. 
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result in lost income or even firing for those in low-wage hourly jobs.142  
If use of an app is made mandatory for public or private services, the 
higher risk of false positives also could disproportionately deny access 
to these same groups.  
Many of these issues require the kind of legal protections identified 
in Part V.  Several of these problems, however, either are a direct result 
of the Google-Apple system’s reliance solely on Bluetooth or 
exacerbated by its limits.  First, as noted above, a system that relies on 
both GPS and Bluetooth proximity would be accessible to far more 
people.  Google’s and Apple’s systems directly exclude people without 
access to newer phones.  To make matters worse, because the system 
collects only Bluetooth information it does not even indirectly benefit 
non-users in the ways that location systems can.  
Second, adding location information significantly reduces the risk 
of false positives that disproportionately harm low-income people and 
people of color.143  More importantly, in contrast to the Google-Apple 
system, which is designed to minimize involvement of the public health 
system and actively prevent it from accessing any information from 
users, systems like Safe Paths are designed to interface directly with the 
manual contact tracing system.144  Establishing this connection is critical 
to providing necessary support and resources and the extensive 
benefits of interacting with trained, caring health professionals.  
Collecting more information is also critical for health authorities to 
better understand how the disease spreads, develop more effective risk 
mitigation strategies (including more refined quarantine 
recommendations), and more effectively allocate scarce resources to 
people at higher risk.145  The Berkman Klein Center for Internet & 
Society Digital Pandemic Response Working Group identified as a major 
issue of concern the significant gaps in the data we need to understand 
the disparate impacts of this pandemic, in particular with respect to 
demographic information like race and ethnicity.146  In the absence of 
this detailed demographic information doctors and epidemiologists 
have resorted to devising improvised tools for estimating the effects of 
142 Id. 
143 See Holistic Solution, supra note 19. 
144 Id. 
145 See, e.g., Drew et. al., supra note 127, at 3–5 (describing mobile applications 
collecting symptoms and other information).  For a much more extensive analysis of 
how digital technology, including apps, could be deployed to improve pandemic 
response, see Petar Radanliev, et al., COVID-19 What Have We Learned? The Rise of Social 
Machines and Connected Devices in Pandemic Management Following the Concepts of 
Predictive, Preventive and Personalized Medicine, 11 EPMA JOURNAL 311, 312 (2020). 
146 Nagy supra note 141. 
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the pandemic on different groups and to identifying tailored response 
strategies.147 
Third, by preventing apps using their system from collecting 
location and other information, these companies have made it 
impossible to conduct the kind of iterative equity analyses that are 
essential to assessing whether and how these apps are helping or 
harming marginalized groups.148  The Google-Apple system’s privacy 
protections make it difficult even to assess whether the app is working 
at all and impossible to analyze demographic differences.149  
Having this kind of information is essential to configuring apps and 
designing complementary alternatives both to maximize access and 
ensure they benefit as many people as possible, as well as to minimize 
disproportionate harms on particular groups.150  The problem with 
Google’s and Apple’s systems is that they have frozen into place a single 
design standard that both prevents us from understanding what works 
and prevents the kind of experimentation necessary to develop apps or 
combinations of apps that could work better for everyone.151 
V.  TRUSTWORTHY PANDEMIC PRIVACY 
Effective disease surveillance does not have to give up on privacy.  
Most of the privacy threats digital contact tracing raises could be 
guarded against by strong and verifiable restrictions on how every 
person’s data is accessed, used, and deleted while still allowing for 
broader use of potentially sensitive information, including location 
information.  We can protect privacy and enable a more effective and 
equitable health surveillance system by putting in place a framework 
that collects only information necessary for public health, keeps 
 147 See Karthik Sivashanker et al., A Data-Driven Approach to Addressing Racial 
Disparities in Health Care Outcomes, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 21, 2020), https://hbr.org/
2020/07/a-data-driven-approach-to-addressing-racial-disparities-in-health-care-
outcomes. 
 148 See, e.g., KAHN ET AL., supra note 59; Landau, supra note 139 (calling for developing 
apps through a process “designed to identify and address potential demographic 
disparities early and continuously”). 
 149 See Chris Wymant et al., The epidemiological impact of the NHS COVID-19 App, 
https://github.com/BDI-pathogens/covid-19_instant_tracing/blob/master/
Epidemiological_Impact_of_the_NHS_COVID_19_App_Public_Release_V1.pdf (describing 
complex indirect information necessary to estimate effects of UK app). 
150 See KAHN ET AL., supra note 59. 
151 Id.; see also Zak Doffman, Yes, Apple And Google Have Given Us A Serious Contact 
Tracing Problem—Here’s Why, FORBES (Jun. 19, 2020, 5:17 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2020/06/19/how-apple-and-google-
created-this-contact-tracing-disaster (“The rigid policing of a common framework has 
tied governments’ hands around the world, offering no flexibility to adapt to scientific 
advice on these unprecedented solutions for the global pandemic.”). 
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sensitive health data secure from redistribution or repurposing, 
transparently monitors how that data is used and assesses whether the 
program works and how it affects vulnerable communities.152 
Much of the concern over digital contact tracing centers over the 
fear that any tool that routinely collects sensitive personal information, 
no matter how well intentioned, can too easily be repurposed for use by 
law enforcement to use in criminal investigations or the national 
security apparatus to spy on individuals.  Those concerns are 
heightened for people of color who historically have been 
disproportionately disadvantaged by new surveillance and other digital 
tools.153  
The public health context is very different from counterterrorism 
or law enforcement.  The legitimate need to hide sources and methods 
makes meaningful transparency and effective oversight of national 
security surveillance programs extremely difficult.  Public health, even 
during emergencies like the current pandemic, does not require similar 
secrecy.  Disease surveillance programs can be monitored and audited, 
without disclosing personally identifying information, to ensure 
compliance with data access and purpose limitations.  
Jane Bambauer and I have identified several core features of a 
national pandemic privacy law necessary to provide a uniform, 
transparent, legally enforceable set of protections to enable the 
responsible collection and use of information to protect public health in 
future pandemics.154  These include setting up a national data repository 
that integrates information from digital contact tracing apps as well as 
other relevant sources.  Congress, in the March 2020 CARES Act, 
required the CDC to develop data-driven COVID-19 solutions and 
appropriated $500 million to them for “public health data surveillance 
and analytics infrastructure modification.”155  President Biden’s COVID-
19 national strategy similarly calls for ramping up the federal 
government’s collection, production, sharing and analysis of data to 
 152 Several groups have recommended similar approaches with more detailed 
guidelines for implementing them even in the absence of formal legal protections.  See, 
e.g., KAHN ET AL., supra note 59; see Kelsey Finch et al., Digital Contact Tracing: A Playbook 
for Responsible Data Use, (Aug. 14, 2020), https://law.mit.edu/pub/digitalcontact
tracingaplaybookforresponsibledatause/release/1. 
153 See Finch et al., supra note 152. 
154 See Bambauer & Ray, supra note 5. 
155 Daniel Felz et al., BREAKING: Location and Mobile Data in the Fight against COVID-
19—An Overview of U.S. and Global Efforts, JD SUPRA (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.jd
supra.com/legalnews/breaking-location-and-mobile-data-in-47904/. 
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“support an equitable COVID-19 response and recovery.”156  Both 
initiatives could incorporate developing this kind of data repository. 
The law should limit the data collection system to collecting only 
information that is necessary to protect public health.  Any information 
that in itself or with other information, including location information 
should be de-identified and the raw data deleted as soon as possible.  
Access to the information should be strictly limited to public health 
authorities and any access to law enforcement should be prohibited.  
Those use and access restrictions should be enforced through 
complete transparency about the system’s design and use without 
disclosing any user data.  The source code should be open to the public.  
The system should log every access to the data and make the access logs 
public.  And the purpose of any non-routine access should also be 
logged.  Routine audits should be conducted either by an independent 
agency or trusted third party. 
Perhaps the most important privacy protection is ensuring that the 
data repository lasts only as long as the need for the program.  The 
program should automatically expire when the emergency has ended or 
when an internal or independent review finds that the data surveillance 
has not added sufficient value for controlling the outbreak. 
Some have questioned whether we need a stand-alone privacy law 
to protect the data collected during pandemics and instead call for 
incorporating those protections into a comprehensive consumer data 
privacy law.157  While I am sympathetic to the idea of a comprehensive 
consumer data privacy law—and appreciate the irony inherent in 
establishing potentially greater privacy protections for the collection 
and use of information during public health crises than for routine 
consumer transactions—the public health context is very different from 
consumer privacy.  Lack of careful thought about those differences and 
the tradeoffs we should be willing to make is a large reason we ended 
up with the ineffective apps that we have today.  
A stand-alone pandemic privacy law is necessary to tailor these 
protections to the specific context of public health generally and 
pandemics specifically.  Several of the protections we identified, 
including the automatic sunset clause, make sense only in the 
emergency context of a pandemic.  Perhaps most importantly, we need 
 156 Kat Jercich, Biden’s COVID-19 Plan Depends on a Data-Driven Approach for Efficacy, 
Equity, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/
bidens-covid-19-plan-depends-data-driven-approach-efficacy-equity. 
 157 E.g., Rich, supra note 60 (“[W]e need a baseline federal privacy law to establish 
clear and enforceable privacy rules across the entire marketplace, one that protects our 
personal information in good times and in times of crisis.”). 
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a pandemic privacy law with the protections just described not merely 
(and not primarily) to protect the privacy of the information the system 
collects.  We need a law that will enable public health authorities to 
collaborate with technology developers to develop, test, and refine new 
tools to understand and respond to new diseases like COVID-19 quickly 
and to ensure that those tools address rather than exacerbate existing 
inequalities.158 
Our original set of minimum principles left out this key 
requirement: the law should require that the system collect the 
information necessary to determine whether new digital tools serve 
public health needs and how they affect different groups, especially 
those most at risk.  We recommended that authorization to create the 
data repository should include an independent oversight board to 
monitor administration of the program.  In addition to ensuring that the 
information is not used for any purpose other than public health as we 
originally proposed, this board should be required to partner with 
outside experts to design and conduct iterative studies of whether and 
how digital contact tracing methods are assisting in the public health 
response and how they can be improved.159  These studies should 
include specific analysis of the effects digital contact tracing and related 
tools have on vulnerable communities and make recommendations to 
correct any injustices attributable to the program as well as to enhance 
access.160 
That same board also should assess proposed incentives or 
disincentives to encourage adoption of new technologies to ensure that 
they are equitable, non-coercive and do not discriminate directly or 
indirectly against any individual or group.161  Access to public services 
and accommodations should not require use of any technology that does 
not meet these criteria and that has not been shown to improve public 
health outcomes. 
Finally, the law should prohibit private companies from controlling 
the capabilities of digital contact tracing and other technologies used for 
public health surveillance or dictating their terms of use.  As the Johns 
 158 Nagy, supra note 141 (“Authorities need to have a transparent plan for not only 
monitoring the effectiveness of these interventions in breaking transmission chains but 
also to guarantee against unintended consequences, particularly for already vulnerable 
or disenfranchised populations.”). 
 159 The agenda outlined by a group of Swiss researchers is a useful starting point for 
assessing effectiveness.  See von Wyl Viktor et al., A Research Agenda for Digital Proximity 
Tracing Apps, 2020 SWISS MED. WEEKLY 150 (2020), https://smw.ch/article/doi/
smw.2020.20324. 
160 See KAHN ET AL., supra note 59, at 7–8. 
161 See id. at 8. 
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Hopkins Project on Ethics and Governance of Digital Contact Tracing 
Technologies has emphasized, the design of these technologies “should 
be capable of evolving depending upon local conditions, new evidence, 
and changing preferences and priorities.”162  This means that public 
health authorities, not technology companies, should control what they 
do and how they work.163 
VI.  CONCLUSION
“An average of 3,100 people in the United States died of the 
coronavirus each day in January—one every 28 seconds.”164 
“[T]he time lag between knowing when a case emerges inside, or 
even proximate to the home, and when an intercept team can be 
mobilized can literally save lives.”165 
“[C]ontact tracing apps do not require tracking the location of 
individual users.”166 
As I complete this Essay, we just endured the worst month of the 
pandemic.  As the Washington Post article quoted above starkly states, 
in the U.S., deaths peaked in January 2021 at one every twenty-eight 
seconds.  COVID-19 alone reduced overall life expectancy of Americans 
in 2020 by more than one year—the largest single-year decline in the 
past forty years.167  That drop is far worse for communities hit hardest 
by this disease: falling by over two years for Black Americans and over 
three years for Latin Americans.168  
As the second quote highlights, epidemiologists tell us that access 
to real-time information about who is contracting this deadly disease 
and where they live, even if it is not granular enough to identify 
exposure definitively, still can save lives.  Would a better digital contact 
tracing app that included the option for users to collect and share that 
information with health authorities have made a difference?  We do not 
know because we never tried.  And we certainly did not know for sure 
that they would not back in May 2020 when the EDPB and many others 
162 Id. at 2. 
163 Id. at 2.  
164 Karin Brulliard, Three Days in the Deadliest Month in the Covid Pandemic, WASH. 
POST. (Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/interactive/2021/
covid-death-toll-january 
165 Curtis et al., supra note 121 (emphasis added). 
166 See EDPB, supra note 59. 
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decided the answer must be no, even and while many apps were still 
proposing to try.169  
It is just plain dumb that we never gave them a chance. 
 169 See KHAN ET AL., supra note 59, at 2 (urging “an approach that recognizes that there 
are complicated issues to resolve for governments, institutions, and businesses and that 
introduction of [digital contact tracing technologies] must include public engagement 
and ongoing assessments to improve both performance and adoption.”).  
